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THE SELF AS OBJECT IN CRITICAL 
READINGS OF JANE EYRE
Lauren Smith
“T o  T e l l  ONE’S story is to present one’s self . . begins Helen von 
Schmidt in an article comparing Dickens and Bronte. “To tell one’s 
story is also to create the self one presents, to do so by the very choices 
one makes in the telling . . she continues, and then goes on to assert 
that both Jane Eyre and Great Expectations are novels in which a self is 
created (von Schmidt 84). Behind von Schmidt’s thoughts on Dickens 
and Bronte are two related and problematic ideas about selfhood. The 
first is that there is such a thing as a self which can be “presented” by 
an author to an audience. It assumes that an author can know what 
she/he is, can see clearly her/his own behavior, motivations, character. 
The second assumption is that the author also “creates” her/his “self’ 
in the process of writing. This assumption is more acceptable because 
it makes room for the unknowable, the unconscious that might be 
located in the “gaps” and “indeterminacies” of the text. Still, however, 
she reveals a fundamental belief that by the end of the text something 
must be formed which is whole. The self is treated like a product, 
something to be arrived at by the end of the production process, the 
story.
Inasmuch as von Schmidt’s use of the word “self’ does still attempt 
to engage us in a discussion about what self is, how it exists in relation 
to the world, etc., it is useful. The problem with her vision is that it 
inspires her to make evaluative statements which are not necessarily 
fair or, more importantly, helpful. Is the self here a whole self? Is it an 
integrated self? Or is it immature (read: sick)? These are the questions 
von Schmidt is really asking. “Jane Eyre and Great Expectations offer two 
almost wholly opposite models of the self and its relation to the 
world,” she says, making her self-as-object perspective quite clear and 
implying that our selves too are objects that can be modeled on 
template fictional selves. “However one honors them separately as
65
great texts, finally, it seems, one is asked to choose one of the two 
exempla the novels offer” (84). In other words, we are to choose which 
template we would like to use in the production of our own selves.
One of the problems with the self-as-product perspective is that it 
encourages an evaluation which ignores the contexts within which it 
was and is read. I was going to say that such a reading is apolitical, but 
this is not true. To evaluate a work outside of context is to evaluate it 
according to some abstract principle, that is, to compare it to some 
ideal and judge it accordingly. Not only is the process of choosing the 
“right” ideal completely arbitrary, but in choosing an idea the writer 
sets up a system whereby texts (and readings of texts) are arranged in 
a hierarchy based on their proximity to that ideal.
The vision of the healthy, mature self as a whole, relatively fixed 
thing manifests itself to varying degrees in all the critical texts I will 
explore in the paper. I would like to reveal how these critics are 
“drenched” (Adrienne Rich’s term) in patriarchal (normative, 
product-oriented) ideas about self, and to, as Schweickart suggests, 
“[take] the part of the woman writer against patriarchal readings that 
trivialize or distort her work” (Schweickart 46).
Perhaps my motivation for beginning my critique of readings with 
von Schmidt comes from my own bias. I love the book Jane Eyre and 
only like and admire Great Expectations; whereas von Schmidt finds 
only Great Expectations truly admirable. The reasons for her evaluation 
have to do with the “models of the self’ presented in the two novels 
(von Schmidt 84). In the beginnings of the two works, she argues, the 
main characters are in much the same sort of position. Both of them 
are orphans living with “figures we recognize as ‘the wicked stepmoth­
er’”; neither knows who her/his real parents are (85). Pip attempts 
immediately to make connections. He spends a lot of time imagining 
what his parents are like and creates an imaginary relationship with 
them (85). Furthermore, he is able, from the very beginning of his 
story, to establish the possibility of connection with such “evil” 
characters as Magwitch and Miss Havisham by seeing their 
humanness—and in the end of the story, to actually bring these 
connections about. “Pip,” according to von Schmidt, “insists that the 
self is created in relation to others and by the nature of that relation” 
(86).
Jane’s self, however, is not “created in relation.” Most of the 
characters in Jane Eyre have “no life of their own; they exist solely as 
figures against whom Jane can assert her own identity” (von Schmidt 
86). Little Jane does not search for connection. She does not seem, for 
example, to be interested in learning anything about her dead 
parents; at the Reeds’ house, she is most happy alone and wrapped up
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in her own imaginings. In fact, “the climate of her real world . . . has 
less interest for her than the climate she absorbs, indeed chooses, in 
the book she is reading. . . (85). Unlike Pip, Jane is never able to 
transcend her history to establish connection with those who have 
done her evil—namely Mrs. Reed and her children (87).
The self created in Jane Eyre is a failure, according to von Schmidt. 
The criteria by which she judges Jane Eyre’s self is one that has to do 
with the ability to connect with others and to accept society. The ideal 
self is the one that can, like Pip, “move into a wider world and share 
an ordinary life” (von Schmidt 90). However, at the end of Charlotte 
Bronte’s novel, the heroine is isolated and full of “self-division” (88). 
What von Schmidt has forgotten in her eagerness to measure the two 
works according to one universal criterion, however, is that Dickens 
was a man creating a male character, and Bronte was a woman 
creating a female character. Ordinary life for Jane Eyre would have 
been stultifying. Whereas Pip could create himself in relation to 
society and other people, Jane could not. The available pool of roles, 
definitions, possibilities for action was unacceptable. If Jane could not 
“admit the presence of any other valid voice” (von Schmidt, p. 91), it 
was because she could not listen to any other voice and survive.
There is something very attractive about Nina Auerbach’s approach 
to the self in Jane Eyre. It is dramatic: “The self is born in [Bronte’s] 
novels out of a clash of extreme and opposing forces. . . (Auerbach 
328). And it is dynamic. Auerbach focuses on the struggle, the 
“unresolved dialectic” of Charlotte Bronte’s mind reflected in images 
of fire and ice (326). “Jane Eyre,” according to Auerbach, “is a double 
character. . . (330).
The governess side of Jane, she argues, the demure and dutiful 
side, is represented by ice. This is the Jane who represses or simply is 
without feeling—the “frozen child” who can admit freely that she does 
not love the Reeds (Auerbach 331). This is also the side of Jane that 
is represented by religious persons and institutions in the story— 
notably Lowood and St. John (332), and even Helen Burns and Miss 
Temple. Auerbach sees this repressive force as continually threaten­
ing takeover. It is in Jane Eyre’s “struggle” with St. John that the 
danger is most obvious and pressing—probably because “his ice is in 
[her]” (334). He is her cousin, part of the family she was deprived of 
as a child, and of all the forces of ice, he is most capable of winning her 
over.
Fire, Auerbach goes on to say, represents the feeling side of Jane. It 
is the part of her personality with which she paints passionate and 
surreal landscapes, the part which addresses and frightens Mrs. Reed, 
the part she sees in the red room mirror and is herself frightened by.
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Despite Jane’s demure carriage in her post as governess, Rochester 
sees and loves this part of Jane calling her a “firespirit” (Jane Eyre 270). 
Again, Auerbach sees many of the things in Jane’s environment as 
simply extensions or projections of Jane’s fiery self. Mr. Rochester and 
Thornfield are, for example, representatives of fire. Despite the 
destructive role fire plays in Jane Eyre, Auerbach seems to find the 
fiery side of Jane’s personality more attractive, more healthy, and 
associated with imagination in a way that she does not explain. 
Furthermore, she finds in Jane’s marriage and in the pious life she 
and Edward live at Ferndean a triumph of the forces of ice. Writes 
Auerbach, “our final sense of the book is that ‘reality’ is ‘imagination’ 
broken and blind” (335). In Auerbach’s eyes this is tragic.
Auerbach’s exploration of the fire and ice imagery in Jane Eyre is 
limited because she attempts to understand everything about Jane’s 
character, Jane’s self, in these terms. Jane therefore can be only a 
two-sided creature—either emotional or “cold” (Auerbach 330). Jane’s 
spirituality can only be seen in terms of coldness, ice, emotionlessness; 
and, possibly more disturbing, no distinction can be made between 
Jane’s anger and her love for Edward Rochester, which are both seen 
as expressions of her fiery side. Such confusion between anger and 
sexuality obscures the true nature of both. Furthermore, it suggests 
that Charlotte Bronte connects the two things in her writing. This is 
not accurate; although Edward is, as Auerbach points out, said to have 
a “flaming glance” and although Jane and Edward’s relationship is 
very intense, it is more often described in spiritual terms, or in terms 
of magic and fairies, than in the language of fire. When Rochester, for 
example, tells the story of his love for Jane to Adele, Jane becomes a 
fairy and the wedding ring becomes a talisman with which Rochester 
can follow her to the moon (Jane Eyre 275-76).
Another problem is that Auerbach’s vision of the self as composed 
of two conflicting forces prevents her from seeing Jane’s feelings as a 
response to her environment. Jane does not fall in love with Edward, 
but simply finds him an occasion for the expression of passion. She 
does not get angry at or because of something, she simply is angry, 
and that anger is expressed in the episode in the red room and at 
Thornfield in the person of Bertha Mason. In fact, according to 
Auerbach, there is no environment in Jane Eyre. Everything in the 
external world is simply a projection of the internal world; “the 
narrator’s conflict is externalized and embodied in the entire uni­
verse” (Auerbach 329). This again is inaccurate. Jane does not simply 
succumb to a passion which is part of her constitution, she falls in love 
with another being whose spirit she recognizes but cannot see in
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entirety, a being whom she is capable of being in conflict with, of 
leaving and returning to.
More importantly, Jane’s rage in the story is not without external 
cause. Bronte sets up a situation full of good reasons for anger. Jane 
Eyre suffers the cruelty of Mrs. Reed and deprivation at the hands of 
Mr. Brocklehurst; and even Edward Rochester deceives and manip­
ulates her. In addition, Jane, like her creator, is aware of her position 
as a woman in the world, and she is angered by it. She paces the hall 
of the third floor, longing for freedom. She asserts her spiritual 
equality with Mr. Rochester at a time when such an assertion would 
have been daring. In a well-known and often quoted passage she 
protests that “women feel just as men feel ; they need exercise for their 
faculties, and a field for their efforts as much as their brothers do; 
they suffer from too rigid a constraint, too absolute a stagnation, 
precisely as men would suffer.. . (Jane Eyre 128). Jane’s anger, then, 
is catalyzed by external forces, and is in part political. By approaching 
the self in Jane Eyre as a pre-existing entity, Auerbach dismisses the 
influence of external forces and avoids the political content of the text.
Furthermore, like von Schmidt, Auerbach ends up evaluating this 
entity as a thing produced by the resolution of the conflict. The ideal 
to which the product-self is compared is implied in Auerbach’s 
disappointment at the end of the novel. “Everything that Rochester 
represented was crushed,” she writes, lamenting his newfound belief 
in the god that “has been an anti-life force throughout the novel. . . 
(Auerbach 335). Rochester, then, represents Jane’s life force, and this 
is the “good” part of her. He represents sexuality and rebellion and 
passion, and at the end of the story these are the things that Jane does 
not have enough of, according to Auerbach. Such a judgm ent is 
reductive and essentialist. It fails to appreciate, even to notice, the 
spiritual element of Jane and her relationship to Edward. Because of 
her inability to see the spiritual in the novel, Auerbach misses the 
significance of positive aspects of Jane and Edward’s marriage— 
especially the politically important reign of spiritual equality at 
Ferndean. “My equal is here,” Bronte has Edward say when he asks 
Jane to marry him (Jane Eyre 304).
In her article, “Two Crises of Decision in Jane Eyre,” Maria Yuen 
seems to avoid passing judgm ent of Jane’s self based on its quality as 
a finished product. She focuses on the two major decisions Jane makes 
in the course of the novel—her decision to leave Rochester and her 
later decision to refuse St. John and return to Rochester—and 
analyzes Jane’s motivation. However, her analysis of motivation is 
flawed by her vision of the self as a determinate and pre-existing 
object.
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“I think the basic motivation underlying Jane’s decision is . . . the 
self,” writes Yuen of the decision to leave Rochester. And later she says 
the decision was made “in self-interest” and for “self-protection” 
rather than for religious or moral reasons, or in order to conform to 
society (Yuen 215). I would have fewer problems with Yuen’s argu­
ment if her vision of the self were less static—and if she took into 
account the relationship between self and society, but she does not. 
She agrees with Ruth Bernard Yeazell that Jane’s “is a struggle to 
preserve the integrity and independence of the self’—assuming the 
pre-existence and autonomy of that self (Yuen 218). She goes on to 
argue that, for Jane, leaving Rochester is “a step towards . . . the 
establishment of identity” (218). Jane’s task, then, is a complex one; 
she must both protect her self-identity and find it. This puts her in the 
position of having to both protect something that does not exist and 
create something that already does. In any case, Yuen seems to believe 
that by the end of the novel, the self should be there, a whole and 
finished thing. And the decisions Jane makes are subject to judgm ent 
based on the ideal of the mature self and whether or not her decisions 
were made by or helped her to reach this ideal. What I find more 
troublesome about the ideal of the autonomous self in this essay is that 
it allows Yuen to avoid discussing the social and political context of the 
story. Charlotte Bronte was aware of the oppression of women, and 
she created characters that were also aware of it. Yet when Yuen 
analyzes the sources of Jane Eyre’s fierce independence, she relies 
exclusively on Jane’s personal history, primarily her experience as an 
orphan and the time she spent with the “ego-centric” Reeds (216). 
Jane Eyre, writes Yuen, feels cut off from the world, and this is both 
the cause and eventually the result of her independence. It is 
interesting that at one point Yuen, like von Schmidt, sees this 
independence as a lack of ability on Jane’s part. “She is the centre of 
her own universe; she cannot relate spontaneously to other peo­
ple. . . .” (Yuen 216). Nowhere in the essay is Jane’s position as a 
woman (or as a member of the semi-servant class of governess) taken 
into account in the development of the intense desire for indepen­
dence that Yuen credits as motivating her decisions. Therefore, Jane’s 
independence and isolation are seen as the somewhat unfortunate 
results of a bad childhood instead of as part of her rebellion against 
the inequality and oppressiveness of her position in society.
Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar do the best job of seeing Jane 
Eyre’s self in a social context and so avoid many of the other 
reader/critics’ problems. With Jane Eyre, the authors write, “the 
young novelist seems . . . definitively to have opened her eyes to 
female realities within and around her” (Gilbert and Gubar 336). Jane
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begins her “progress towards maturity” according to Gilbert and 
Gubar, with the red room episode, for it is here she first sees herself 
and her position in the world. It is here she resolves to free herself, 
and she does so by telling the truth, by saying what “neither a 
Victorian child nor a Cinderella was ever supposed to be capable” of 
saying (343). The result is that Jane is literally freed from Gateshead.
She is sent to Lowood, Gilbert and Gubar explain, where she begins 
a new stage in her development. At Lowood, Jane’s self continues the 
process of maturation largely through her association with Helen 
Burns and Miss Temple. Gilbert and Gubar agree with Adrienne Rich 
that Helen and Miss Temple are “mothers for Jane . . . comforting 
her, counselling her, feeding her, embracing her.” Both mothers 
contain “a ‘sewer’ of concealed resentment” and offer Jane models for 
“com[ing] to terms with her fate” (Gilbert and Gubar 346). But their 
ways are the thoroughly conventional ways of “ladylike repression” 
and “saintly renunciation,” and Jane rejects them (347).
In their discussion of the first part of Jane Eyre, it is clear that 
Gilbert and Gubar do take social context into account. Indeed it is 
their main concern. Because of this, they are able to see things crucial 
to the development of the story that the other reader/critics miss. 
Maria Yuen, for example, does not see the importance of Jane Eyre’s 
love for and rejection of Miss Temple and Helen Burns as role 
models, because she does not consider societal expectations that Jane 
be a Helen Burns or a Miss Temple. None of the other critics 
recognize the importance, furthermore, of the act of speaking— 
specifically, Jane’s speaking out against the harsh treatment of Mrs. 
Reed—because they do not look at the act of speaking in the context 
of traditionally silent “Victorian children and Cinderellas.” Gilbert 
and Gubar’s analysis of the Gateshead and Lowood sections is already 
successful in a way the other texts are not.
The title of Gilbert and Gubar’s section on Charlotte Bronte, “The 
Spectral Selves of Charlotte Bronte,” suggests a number of things 
about the state of “self’ in Bronte’s work. To begin with, it suggests 
that it is divided—like a spectrum. Furthermore, it suggests that these 
selves or pieces of selves are ghostly, like specters, or unreal. In fact, 
Gilbert and Gubar find both a self that is splintered and resulting 
partial selves that are either from the world of ghosts and monsters, or 
are in some other way unreal.
The most obvious manifestation of the splintered self is Bertha 
Mason, the mad wife of Edward Rochester and the character to which 
the title of Gilbert and Gubar’s book refers. That Bertha is not just a 
symbol but is Jane herself, or some part of Jane, is made clear, 
according to Gilbert and Gubar, in a number of passages—including
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the one in which Bertha makes her first appearance to Jane. Bertha 
“puts on the wedding veil intended for the second Mrs. Rochester, 
and turns to the mirror.” Jane sees Bertha’s face in the mirror “as if it 
were her own” (Gilbert and Gubar 362). More importantly, Bertha 
does what Jane would like to do. Each of her attacks follows an 
incident which might rightly have angered Jane. It is Bertha who 
prevents a wedding about which Jane has very serious doubts (359- 
60). And it is Bertha who causes Rochester’s maiming, an event Jane 
herself “in disguised hostility” predicts (360). Bertha embodies Jane’s 
angry self—her “mad” self.
Other, less threatening aspects of the spectral self are embodied by 
less frightening figures, write Gilbert and Gubar. There is, for 
example, the dream image of the “baby-phantom,” representative of 
Jane’s past self (358). Both Rochester and St. John are also seen by 
Gilbert and Gubar as aspects of Jane’s fragmented self. St. John, as 
Auerbach has already pointed out, represents the icy part of Jane— 
the part that belongs to control and the patriarchal structures of 
religion, the part that is self-sacrificing, that belongs to the world of 
Helen Burns and to death. Rochester is passion and sexuality (Gilbert 
and Gubar 366).
Gilbert and Gubar see this splintering of the self as a kind of 
sickness. That they are, in part, setting out to map a kind of pathology 
in the writings of nineteenth-century women is apparent in the title of 
the book, The Madwoman in the Attic, and is further expressed in some 
of the chapter titles: “The Infection in the Sentence,” “The Secret 
Inward Wound.” By suggesting that Bronte’s splintered, “spectral” 
selves are unhealthy, Gilbert and Gubar reveal their assumption that 
there is another kind of self, a healthy, whole self. They suggest, 
furthermore, that this mature self is or should be the final destination 
of the main character. And, in fact, a healthy self is what Gilbert and 
Gubar decide Jane Eyre has at the end of her story. When “she 
escapes from [St. John’s] fetters”—his proposal of marriage—she has 
come to the end of her pilgrimage. At that moment, she is “freed from 
the burden of her past, freed from both the raging specter of Bertha 
. . . and from the self-pitying specter of the orphan child . . .” (Gilbert 
and Gubar 368).
Gilbert and Gubar too believe in the self as a thing that can be 
achieved, the self-as-product. They do not question the ideal of the 
healthy self. In this way, they resemble the other reader/critics I have 
discussed. Unlike von Schmidt and Auerbach, however, Gilbert and 
Gubar accept the final version of Jane’s self as “right”—the ideal or 
some version of the ideal. But how can Jane be freed from her past? 
How can she be freed from the anger that Bertha Mason represents?
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Or the “icy,” religious part of her that St. John represents? Gilbert and 
Gubar’s acceptance of Jane’s self as mature, whole, healthy has 
problematic political implications. For one thing, as I have already 
pointed out, the creation or acceptance of ideals is the creation or 
acceptance of hierarchies. Also, notions of maturity, wholeness, etc., 
exist outside of material considerations, do not take historical and 
material context into account. Whatever Jane is, “whole” or not, 
“healthy” or not, is a function of her situation, her history, her 
position in the world.
The problem is both theoretical—we do not want to be part of a 
system that marginalizes and valorizes according to an ideal—and 
practical. The ideal of the healthy self relegates everything else to the 
realm of sickness. Since not many of us will inherit a fortune, find a 
long-lost “respectable” and loving family, or have our favorite (and 
necessarily male) lover miraculously humbled, few of us will ever find 
ourselves in a situation similar to Jane’s at Ferndean. How can we be 
“whole” in the same way Jane is if we are not financially independent? 
If we are not able to ascend to the leisured class? If we do not find, in 
the end, that we are from a good and loving family? If we do not find 
our perfect lover? How will we know we have reached wholeness in 
the absence of these trappings? It seems unwise to me to accept this 
(or any) vision of maturity and wholeness since then we would have to 
label as sickness or immaturity whatever does not conform.
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